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ABSTRACT
Given a collection of selfish agents who wish to establish links
to route traﬃc among themselves, the set of equilibrium network
topologies may appear quite diﬀerent from the centrally enforced
optimum. We study the quality (price of anarchy) of equilib-
rium networks in a game where links require the consent of both
participants and are negotiated bilaterally, and compare these
networks to those generated by an earlier model due to Fabrikant
et al. [10] in which links are formed unilaterally. We provide a
partial characterization of stable and eﬃcient networks in the bi-
lateral network formation game, and provide examples of stable
networks that are not Nash graphs in the unilateral game. We
develop an upper and lower bound on the price of anarchy of the
bilateral game. An empirical analysis demonstrates that the av-
erage price of anarchy is better in the bilateral connection game
than the unilateral game for small link costs but worse as links
become more expensive. In the process, a relationship between
link-based graph stability and two game-theoretic equilibrium no-
tions is discussed. This relationship helps to develop a partial
geometric characterization of equilibrium graphs in the bilateral
connection game.
∗This is a revised version of the published PODC’05 pa-
per, fixing a number of errors. The discussion is modified
in various places to reflect these corrections. The lower and
upper bounds on price of anarchy (PoA) in the bilateral con-
nection game (BCG) are unaﬀected (Propositions 3 and 4).
The proof of Proposition 5 that all Nash graphs of the uni-
lateral connection game (UCG) are pairwise stable in the
BCG (for the same link cost) was incorrect, and the re-
sult is restated here for trees. Since this paper was pub-
lished, Corollary 2 that the PoA is no better in the BCG
than the UCG, whatever the link cost, has been established
through results of Demaine et al. [8], who also established
that our upper-bound for the BCG is tight. Proposition 2
that pairwise-stable networks in BCG are achievable as a
proper equilibrium was incorrect and is restated here for a
special case (thanks to E´va Tardos, who pointed out a prob-
lem with Lemma 2.) Definitions 2 and 3 are also slightly
modified to replace a weak inequality with a strict inequal-
ity when adding an edge (thanks to Lasse Kliemann).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many network settings involve strategic peer selection by
independent agents which can be modeled game-theoretically
as network formation. These networks are formed endoge-
nously by the actions of agents selfishly maximizing an in-
dividual objective function. For this reason, the overall ef-
ficiency of such networks, which are the stable outcomes of
decentralized strategic interactions, can be worse than the
network(s) formed by a central authority maximizing aggre-
gate utility. Understanding this tension between stability
and eﬃciency lies at the heart of our investigation into net-
work formation.
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16, 20] coin the term
price of anarchy to refer to the increase in cost caused by
independent selfish behavior with respect to the centralized,
social welfare-maximizing solution. The price of anarchy has
received much attention in games dealing with various net-
working issues, such as load balancing [7, 21], routing [20],
and flow control [9]. This paper is part of a growing body
of literature [10, 3, 2, 6] that studies the price of anarchy in
network design, where individuals decide whether or not to
form links in a shared network.
In many networking applications agents’ interactions are
regulated by an intermediary. For this reason, we are in-
terested in how the rules governing the network formation
process aﬀect the game’s equilibrium outcomes. We study
how the quality of worst-case and average-case equilibrium
networks diﬀer between a network formation game where
link creation requires bilateral consent as compared to a
setting where links can be established unilaterally. We view
the distinction between bilateral and unilateral formation as
something that can be controlled through rules enforced by
an intermediary.
The network design game that we study is based on a
communication network model by Fabrikant et al. [10] in
which agents are nodes and their strategic choices create
an undirected graph. We augment the model by having
links formed bilaterally (instead of unilaterally) and having
the cost of links shared equally between participating nodes.
The incorporation of consent represents a natural, realistic
extension for a model where traﬃc routing costs are incurred
at both ends of a link.
The bilateral connection game (BCG) is described as fol-
lows. Each node simultaneously chooses a (possibly empty)
subset of the other nodes in the game, and a link between
any two nodes is established if it has the consent of both
parties directly involved in the link. The intersection of
these sets of edges is the resulting graph. The edges are
undirected, meaning that they can be used to route traﬃc
in both directions. Payoﬀs are construed as costs, meaning
that agents are trying to minimize their respective costs of
participating in the network, and the cost incurred by an
agent is expressed as a trade-oﬀ between the cost of estab-
lishing links to other agents and its proximity to the rest of
the network. We refer to the model by Fabrikant et al. [10] as
the unilateral connection game (UCG). It diﬀers from ours
in that agents can unilaterally establish links and in the req-
uisite solution concepts for the diﬀerent models’ evaluation.1
1.1 Our Results
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
Adopting the concept of pairwise stability in place of Nash
equilibrium, we provide an upper and lower bound on the
price of anarchy of the bilateral connection game. We pro-
vide a partial characterization of the pairwise stable and
eﬃcient networks in the bilateral connection game, and give
examples of pairwise stable networks that are not achiev-
able in a Nash equilibrium of the unilateral game. We prove
that a subset of equilibrium networks in the unilateral game
are pairwise stable in the bilateral game (for the same link
cost α), and conjecture that this holds for all equilibrium
networks.
We conduct an empirical analysis that demonstrates that
the average price of anarchy is better in the bilateral con-
nection game than in the unilateral game for small link costs
but worse as links become more expensive. We explain this
by observing that the bilateral setting leads to networks with
more links, on average. Along the way, we show a relation-
ship between pairwise stability and a two-player coalitional
refinement of Nash called pairwise Nash, as well as a non-
cooperative solution concept termed a proper equilibrium.
Working with pairwise stability is helpful in developing a
partial geometric characterization of equilibrium networks
in the bilateral connection game. The approach illustrates
how the correspondence between diﬀerent solution concepts
can be leveraged to gain structural insight into equilibrium
graphs.
The rest of the paper takes the following form: We first
discuss related work, before providing a formal introduction
to connection games in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the
equilibrium and network stability notions that underly much
of our analysis. In Section 4, we provide our main results
characterizing and comparing the set of stable and eﬃcient
network graphs in the unilateral and bilateral connection
1The incorporation of consent forces us to use an alternative
solution concept to analyze stable networks.
games. Section 5 presents empirical analysis comparing the
two games. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Related Work
Fabrikant et al. [10] study a network creation game in the
context of communication networks where links are gener-
ated by the unilateral actions of players and link costs are
one-sided. Our bilateral network creation model may be
better suited for modeling communication network design,
given that interconnect costs are typically two-sided.
There is a growing interest in understanding how simple
rules of engagement established by a system designer will
aﬀect the functioning of a networked system maintained en-
dogenously by the strategic actions of participants [13]. In
order to understand the role of bilateral consent in strategic
network formation, we compare equilibria and bounds on
the price of anarchy in our bilateral network creation game
with the unilateral model proposed by Fabrikant et al. [10].
Anshelevich et al. [3, 2] study a diﬀerent cost-sharing net-
work connection game where, given an undirected graph
structure G, players have a set of specified terminal nodes
that they would like to see connected in the purchased net-
work (which is necessarily a subgraph of G). In [2], they
study how fair cost allocation schemes aﬀect the quality of
the best Nash equilibrium network, and so understand the
protocol constraining agents’ interactions as suggesting an
equilibrium outcome. Our model includes only local cost-
sharing and our interaction protocol is restricted to a rule
for how individual links are formed and severed, and does
not propose a specific equilibrium selection rule. Of men-
tion is that the welfare optimal solution is stable for both
connection games we consider.
Lopez-Pintado [17] and Melendex-Jimenez [18] both con-
sider bilateral network formation models with local cost shar-
ing, but their models diﬀer from our model in the payoﬀ
structure and the equilibrium concepts applied. Payoﬀs
in both these models are link-separable and derived from
underlying (anti-)coordination games, while the benefits of
connections in our bilateral game are formulated in terms
of a QoS measure based on the entire network topology.
Also, both papers use the Nash equilibrium solution con-
cept whereas we rely on the pairwise Nash equilibrium and
pairwise stability.
Kannan et al. [15] investigate the eﬀects on network ar-
chitecture of diﬀerent distance-based utility functions, but
investigate the problem from the standpoint of Nash net-
works (as developed by Bala and Goyal [4]) and only con-
sider unilateral link costs. Finally Haller and Sarangi [11]
provide characterizations of stable networks under one-sided
and two-sided link formation costs for a class of link-based
payoﬀs. We are concerned with a diﬀerent payoﬀ structure,
provide a stronger characterization of stable networks for
our specific domain, and focus on the price of anarchy.
2. THE BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL
CONNECTION GAMES
In this section, we present two versions of the Connection
Game discussed in this paper: the Unilateral Connection
Game (UCG) by Fabrikant et al. [10] and a modified ver-
sion of the game, including equal-split bilateral link cost
shares and mutual consent in link formation, that we call
the Bilateral Connection Game (BCG).
Both games have a finite set of players N = {1, ..., n}. The
strategy space of player i ∈ N is the list of other players,
i.e. the set Si = {(sij)j ̸=i|sij ∈ {0, 1}} where |Si| = 2n−1.
Player i seeks contact with player j if sij = 1. Players si-
multaneously announce the list of other players with whom
they wish to be connected. Their decisions generate an undi-
rected graph G(s) = (N,A(s)) as per the linking rule of the
game. This is a single-stage game with simultaneous an-
nouncements.
In the UCG, A(s) = {(i, j) : i ̸= j, sij = 1 ∨ sji = 1}.
Therefore, a link (i, j) is formed if either participant in the
link decides to establish the connection. In the BCG, on the
other hand, A(s) = {(i, j) : i ̸= j, sij = 1∧sji = 1}. That is,
both players i and j must agree to establish a link in order
for it to be created. The only diﬀerence between the two
games in the creation of links is this issue of consent.
The cost incurred by player i when all players adopt strat-
egy s is additive in the cost of the number of connections
|si| that player i establishes (or wishes to establish) with
other agents, as well as in the sum of the costs of reaching
all other agents. Let α > 0 denote the link cost. The cost
to player i is:
ci(s) = α |si|+
∑
j∈N
d(i,j)(G(s)) (1)
where d(i,j)(G(s)) is the shortest-path distance (in vertex
hops) between nodes i and j in the graph G(s). If no path
exists between i and j then d(i,j)(G(s)) =∞.
The model represents a network setting in which links
are costly but good connectivity is desirable. In both the
unilateral and bilateral connection games, players seek to
minimize their costs (1). While the cost function implies
a cost in the BCG for provisioning for links that may not
actually form, this cost α without a corresponding edge will
not be incurred in equilibrium.
3. NETWORK EQUILIBRIUMCONCEPTS
In order to characterize the structure of networks resulting
from the network formation games discussed above we need
to define what constitutes an equilibrium.
When networks arise from the unilateral action of players,
as in the UCG, standard Nash equilibrium analysis can be
informative about the structure of networks that emerge.
Let s = sN = (si, sN\i) and let ζ designate the set of all
undirected networks on players N .
Definition 1 (Nash eq.). A graph G(s) ∈ ζ is a Nash
equilibrium network if there exists a strategy s that supports
G(s) where ci(s) ≤ ci(s′i, sN\i) for all i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si.2
This definition is valid for both the BCG and UCG. How-
ever, when network links require the consent of both parties,
as in the BCG, a coordination problem arises: the game dis-
plays a multiplicity of Nash equilibria stemming from play-
ers’ capacity for mutual blocking in the formation of links.
For example, the empty network is always a Nash equi-
librium when every agent refuses to establish any link. Put
another way, an equilibrium concept that only accounts for
2We restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria for two
reasons: pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, and
the network stability notion of pairwise stability that we
deal with throughout this paper is defined deterministically.
single player deviations is insuﬃcient; an appropriate equi-
librium concept must consider coalitional moves. A Nash
equilibrium outcome that satisfies the additional require-
ment that it is stable to all bilateral deviations is referred
to as a pairwise Nash equilibrium.
In the specific context of our network formation game,
a pairwise Nash network is one that contains every mutu-
ally beneficial connection given the current graph but no
more. In considering only bilateral moves, this is the mini-
mal coalitional refinement of Nash required by games with
consent and as such captures the minimal level of coordi-
nation amongst players. We further justify this solution
concept by providing conditions under which pairwise Nash
equilibria in our game correspond to an uncoordinated equi-
librium this is robust to small perturbations.
For BCG, it is helpful to define the n-square matrix Λ(i,j),
in which all entries are zero except for λij = λji = 1. This
represents a strategy matrix (with row i corresponding to the
strategy of player i) that yields a graph with link (i, j). For
the UCG, matrix Λ(i,j) is defined as the n-square matrix in
which all entries are zero except for λij = 1. By an abuse of
notation, we will write ΛB for edge set B to designate the
strategy matrix that yields a graph with all links (i, j) ∈ B.
Whether this is the strategy matrix for a BCG or UCG game
will be clear by context.
Definition 2 (Pairwise Nash). A graph G(s) ∈ ζ is
a pairwise Nash equilibrium network if there exists a strat-
egy s that supports G(s) as a Nash equilibrium, and for all
(i, j) /∈ A(s), if ci(s + Λ(i,j)) < ci(s) then cj(s + Λ(i,j)) >
cj(s).
This definition is valid for both the BCG and UCG. The
set of Nash equilibria and pairwise Nash equilibria coincide
in the UCG, since ci(s+Λ(i,j)) ≥ ci(s) is true for any Nash
equilibrium.
Following Jackson and Wolinsky [14], we also define the
following network stability concept for the BCG:
Definition 3 (Pairwise stable). A graph G(s) ∈ ζ
is pairwise stable in the BCG if for all (i, j) ∈ A(s), ci(s −
Λ(i,j)) ≥ ci(s), while for all (i, j) /∈ A(s), if ci(s + Λ(i,j)) <
ci(s) then cj(s+ Λ(i,j)) > cj(s).
Let ΓPS ⊂ ζ denote the set of pairwise stable networks on
N players. The notion of pairwise stability captures a net-
work’s stability to the deletion and addition of a single link.
To be present, a link must be mutually (weakly) profitable
for both players at either end of the link. A link that is
missing from the graph, but profitable for one player at the
end of the link, must be unprofitable for the other player.
In this sense, link severance is unilateral, while link creation
is bilateral.
Pairwise stability is a network stability concept that is
based on an edge-by-edge analysis of the network rather
than an analysis of player strategies (as in a Nash equi-
librium). The concept is appealing because it can generate
sharp predictions about the tension between stability and
eﬃciency in many contexts [14], and because it makes it
easier to characterize the topology of equilibrium networks.
In fact, in the BCG the two solution concepts coincide.
That a pairwise Nash equilibrium is pairwise stable is im-
mediate because the two concepts are identical under the ad-
dition of links, while pairwise stability only allows an agent
to consider the deletion of a single link at a time while pair-
wise Nash allows for the deletion of any number of links. To
prove the other direction we leverage a result about convex
games due to Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ [5]. For this, let
Γ ⊆ ζ denote a subset of all undirected networks.
Definition 4 (Convex costs). A cost function ci is
convex on Γ if for all s s.t. G(s) = (N,A(s)) ∈ Γ, all i ∈ N ,
and B ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ A(s)} we have:
ci(s− ΛB)− ci(s) ≥
∑
p∈B
ci(s− Λp). (2)
Convexity on set Γ implies that the joint marginal value
of a group of links in the network is greater than the sum
of the marginal values of each link, for all strategy profiles
s that correspond to a network in Γ.
Proposition 1. A graph G(s) ∈ ζ for strategy profile s
is pairwise stable in the BCG if and only if it is a pairwise
Nash equilibrium.
We use the following lemma to prove the result.
Lemma 1. The cost function ci for the BCG is convex on
all graphs G ∈ ζ.3
Proof. Recall G(s) = (N,A(s)). Let (i, j) ∈ A(s). Note
that d(i,k)(G(s)) ≤ d(i,k)(G(s− Λ(i,j))),∀k ∈ N. Let
∆(i,j)(s) =
{
k ∈ N : d(i,k)(G(s)) < d(i,k)(G(s− Λ(i,j)))
}
.
In particular, we always have j ∈ ∆(i,j)(s). Then
ci(s− Λ(i,j)(s)) =∑
k∈∆(i,j)(s)
[d(i,k)(G(s− Λ(i,j)))− d(i,k)(G(s))]− α.
Let (i, l) ∈ A(s), where l ̸= j and ∆{(i,j),(i,l)}(s) ={
k ∈ N : d(i,k)(G(s)) < d(i,k)(G(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)}))
}
.
Then ci(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)}(s)) =∑
k∈∆{(i,j),(i,l)}(s)
[
d(i,k)(G(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)}))− d(i,k)(G(s))
]−2α.
Consider the following. First,{
∆(i,j)(s) ∪∆(i,l)(s)
}
⊂ ∆{(i,j),(i,l)}(s).
Indeed, for all k ∈ ∆(i,j)(s), we have
d(i,k)(G(s)) < d(i,k)(G(s−Λ(i,j))) ≤ d(i,k)(G(s−Λ{(i,j),(i,l)})).
Identically for ∆(i,l)(s). Second, ∆(i,j)(s)∩∆(i,l)(s) = ∅. To
see this, let k ∈ ∆(i,j)(s)∩∆(i,l)(s). Then both l and j are on
two diﬀerent shortest paths in G(s) between i and k. Con-
sider the shortest path in G(s) between i and k that crosses
through l. This path still exists in G(s − Λ(i,j)(s)), imply-
ing that d(i,k)(G(s−Λ(i,j))) = d(i,k)(G(s)), in contradiction
with k ∈ ∆(i,j)(s). Third,
d(i,k)(G(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)}))− d(i,k)(G(s))
≥d(i,k)(G(s− Λ(i,j)(s)))− d(i,k)(G(s)),
3This proof is based on a result by Calvo´-Armengol and Ilk-
ilic¸ [5], who established convexity for the connections
model [14].
because
d(i,k)(G(s− Λ(i,j)(s))) ≤ d(i,k)(G(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)})).
So too for d(i,k)(G(s−Λ(i,l)(s)))− d(i,k)(G(s)). Altogether,
this implies that:
ci(s− Λ{(i,j),(i,l)}(s)) ≥ ci(s− Λ(i,j)(s)) + ci(s− Λ(i,l)(s)).
This proves that cost function ci is convex.
We now show that convexity means that pairwise stability
implies a network is a pairwise Nash equilibrium. By pair-
wise stability, no player has an incentive to sever any single
link in a unilateral deviation, and thus no player has an in-
centive to sever multiple links by convexity. This satisfies
the pairwise Nash requirement in regard to the eﬀect of a
player’s strategy on existing edges. In considering the eﬀect
of some strategy s′i ̸= si on adding links, the requirement
that strategy s be a Nash equilibrium is vacuous because
sji = 0 for any sij = 0, and so a unilateral deviation can
only incur cost without creating an edge. The remaining re-
quirement in regard to cooperatively adding a single, missing
link is the same for pairwise stable and pairwise Nash.
Still, the concept of a pairwise Nash equilibrium allows
explicit player coordination in regard to adding a link. We
can gain further justification for this equilibrium concept by
establishing a relationship between pairwise Nash networks
and networks formed in a proper equilibrium [19].
Definition 5 (Proper equilibrium). A pure strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ is proper if there exists a sequence {ϵt}t∈N of
positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence of
completely mixed equilibrium strategy profiles {σϵt}t∈N with
limit σ such that, for all i ∈ N , all s′i, s′′i ∈ Si, and all t ∈ N,
we have:
E
[
ci(s
′
i, σ
ϵt
N\i)
]
< E
[
ci(s
′′
i ,σ
ϵt
N\i)
]
implies σϵti (s
′′
i ) ≤ ϵt·σϵti (s′i).
In a proper equilibrium, players play a best response to
perturbations of their opponents’ strategies, where costly
mistakes are made with less probability. This is a non-
cooperative refinement of Nash equilibrium and does not
require any coordination on the part of players. Every game
has a proper equilibrium in mixed strategies [19].
Using a result by Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ [5], we estab-
lish that all pairwise Nash equilibrium networks in the BCG
that satisfy a convexity property are proper equilibria. For
this, we introduce an additional notion of convexity, which
is stated for link addition and deletion.
Definition 6 (Link convexity). A graph G(s) =
(N,A(s)) ∈ ζ is link convex if for all (i, k) /∈ A(s), and
all (l,m) ∈ A(s),∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s))−
∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s+ Λ(i,k)))
<
∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s− Λ(l,m)))−
∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s)).
Considering the eﬀect on distances, this says that the de-
crease in cost to agent i from adding a missing link (i, k) is
less than the increase in cost to agent l from removing an
existing link (l,m). Link convexity is a suﬃcient condition
for a graph to be pairwise stable for some link cost α.
Lemma 2. A graph G(s) = (N,A(s)) ∈ ζ is pairwise sta-
ble for some link cost α if the graph is link convex.
Proof. Graph G(s) is pairwise stable for link cost α if
and only if α ∈ (αmin,αmax], where αmin =
max
(i,k)/∈A(s)
min
{∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s))−
∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s+ Λ(i,k))),
∑
j
d(k,j)(G(s))−
∑
j
d(k,j)(G(s+ Λ(i,k)))
}
,
and αmax =
min
(l,m)∈A(s)
{∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s− Λ(l,m)))−
∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s))
}
.
To understand this characterization of pairwise stability,
note that for link addition, we only require that the link cost
α is too high for the least-interested agent involved in the
link, i.e. the agent who incurs the least benefit from the new
link (i, k). Then α must be more expensive than the largest
cost savings to any of these least-interested agents (this is
αmin), since otherwise i and k would bilaterally establish
that link.
On the other hand, α can be no bigger than the minimum
reduction in distance costs that any player, say l, would
achieve by severing some link to m (this is αmax), otherwise
l will unilaterally opt to sever that link.
Link convexity is a suﬃcient property for the existence
of a link cost α for which G(s) is pairwise stable. This is
because αmin ≤
max
(i,k)/∈A(s)
{∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s))−
∑
j
d(i,j)(G(s+ Λ(i,k)))
}
<
min
(l,m)∈A(s)
{∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s− Λ(l,m)))−
∑
j
d(l,j)(G(s))
}
,
(3)
where the weak inequality is by the definition of αmin, and
the strict inequality follows by the definition of link convex-
ity.
We now appeal to the following result, which holds when
neither agent on either end of a link (i, j) absent from G(s)
would consent to the addition of the link:
Lemma 3 (Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ [5]). A
pairwise Nash network G(s) = (N,A(s)) ∈ ζ for link cost α
where, for any edge (i, j) /∈ A(s) then ci(s+ Λ(i,j)) > ci(s),
is a proper equilibrium for the same link cost.
Proposition 2. A graph G(s) = (N,A(s)) ∈ ζ is achiev-
able as a proper equilibrium of the BCG for some link cost
α if the graph is link convex.
Proof. By link convexity, there exists some link cost
α such that no agent on either end of a missing link can
benefit from adding the link (3). The result follows by
Lemma 3, noting that this graph is also a pairwise sta-
ble network by Lemma 2, and a pairwise Nash network by
Proposition 1.
Going forward, we adopt the simple notion of pairwise
stability to characterize the set of equilibrium topologies in
the BCG and study the price of anarchy of the BCG.
4. STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF
NETWORKS IN THE BCG
In this section we address the question of what pairwise
stability predicts concerning the graphs that might form in
the BCG. We proceed as follows. We first characterize the
set of eﬃcient graphs and provide a partial characteriza-
tion of topologies that are stable in the bilateral game, with
a particular focus on graphs which are not achievable in a
Nash equilibrium of the UCG in order to show the diﬀerence
between the outcomes of the two games. We then prove an
upper and lower bound on the price of anarchy in the BCG.
The theoretical analysis in this section is complemented with
an empirical analysis in Section 5, where we study the av-
erage price of anarchy of stable networks in both the BCG
and UCG.
In discussing the eﬃciency of a graph we appeal to the
notion of the social cost of a graph. By an abuse of notation
we let C(G) denote the social cost for the graph G(s) =
(N,A(s)). The social cost of a network G(s) in the BCG is
the sum of all players’ costs,
C(G) =
∑
i∈N
ci(s) = 2α |A(s)|+
∑
i,j∈N
d(i,j)(G(s)). (4)
The eﬃcient graph is the graph that minimizes the social
cost. Noting that every pair of non-neighboring vertices is
at least distance two apart, the following is a lower bound
for the social cost:
C(G) ≥ 2α |A(s)|+ 2 |A(s)|+ 2(n(n− 1)− 2 |A(s)|) (5)
= 2n(n− 1) + 2(α− 1) |A| .
The bound is met by any graph G(s) of diameter two.
Lemma 4. For the BCG and link cost α < 1, the complete
graph is the only eﬃcient graph and the only pairwise stable
graph.
Proof. To prove the first statement, by (5), the social
optimum is achieved when |A| is maximum. Moreover, con-
sider s′ = s+Λ(i,j), (i, j) /∈ A(s). Then ck(s′) = ck(s)+α−
1 < ck(s), k = {i, j} and ck(s′) ≤ ck(s), k ∈ N\{i, j}. For
the second statement, note that any stable graph must be
of diameter 1, since the addition of any new link will reduce
inter-node distances by at least 1 > α.
For link cost α < 1, there is no conflict between stability
and eﬃciency. The situation changes for α > 1. This is
true in both the BCG and UCG. Indeed, many network
formation models [10, 13] exhibit such a transition.
Lemma 5. For link cost α > 1, the star network is the
only eﬃcient graph in the BCG. The star network is also
pairwise stable, but one of many stable graphs.
Proof. For the first statement, the total cost of k indi-
rect links in a graph G is 2k. For α > 1, the cost from a
direct link exceeds the cost from an indirect link of length
two. So direct links must be minimized, as (5) suggests, and
the length of all indirect connections must be two. On the
other hand, the connectedness of G requires at least n − 1
direct connections. Given these conditions, the star is the
only eﬃcient network. To prove that the star is pairwise
stable, note that no two non-adjacent agents have any in-
centive to link directly in a star while no agent wants to
disconnect themselves from the graph. That the star is not
unique is proven by the diﬀerent stable topologies that are
mentioned in the discussion that follows (Lemma 6).
The non-uniqueness of the socially optimal graph amongst
pairwise stable graphs for link cost α > 1 is what motivates
our analysis of the cost of the worst-case equilibrium (other-
wise called the price of anarchy) of the BCG. The network
is formed endogenously solely by the actions of players, and
so this worst case scenario cannot be guarded against.
The price of anarchy ρ (≥ 1) of a network G is defined
as follows: ρ(G) = C(G)/min
G′∈ζ
C(G′). In words, this is the
ratio of social cost of the graph G to the social cost of the
eﬃcient graph.
The price of anarchy of the BCG is defined as the ratio of
social costs of the highest cost pairwise stable graph to the
eﬃcient graph:
ρBCG = max
G∈ΓPS
ρ(G), (6)
where ΓPS ⊂ ζ is the set of pairwise stable networks.
For α > 1, the eﬃcient graph is the star graph, and the
price of anarchy of a network G with edges A is:
ρ(G) =
2α |A|+∑
i,j
d(i,j)(G)
2αn+ 2n(n− 1) (7)
We now identify some graphs that are pairwise stable for
this range of link costs:
Lemma 6. The cycle Cn is pairwise stable in the BCG
for some link cost α > 1, and has price of anarchy ρ(Cn) =
O(1).
Proof. (Sketch) By link convexity, Cn is pairwise stable
if n
2−4n+4
8 < α <
n(n−2)
4 for n = 4k − 2, n
2−4n+8
8 < α <
n(n−2)
4 for n = 4k,
(n−3)(n+1)
8 < α <
(n+1)(n−1)
4 for n =
2k − 1, all for k ∈ N. Then α = O(n2), and ρ(Cn) =
O(2αn + n3)/(2αn+ 2n2) = O(n3/n3) = O(1).
We can also show that all strongly regular graphs (see Fig-
ure 1), where all adjacent vertices have λ > 0 common
neighbors, and all non-adjacent vertices have µ > 1 com-
mon neighbors are pairwise stable. These graphs also have
price of anarchy O(1). The proof is omitted for lack of space.
There are, however, more costly, pairwise stable networks in
the BCG.
4.1 A Lower Bound on the Price of Anarchy
We establish a lower bound on the price of anarchy of the
BCG by considering the pairwise stability of a class of regu-
lar graphs whose order (the size of the graph) is a constant
factor of the Moore bound [12]. The Moore bound estab-
lishes an upper limit n = (k(k − 1)D − 2)/2 on the number
of nodes n of a regular graph Gk,D of degree k and diameter
D.
Proposition 3. The worst-case price of anarchy in the
BCG is Ω(log2 α) for link cost α.
To prove this we make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 7. All regular graphs Gk,D (for degree k and di-
ameter D) whose order is a constant factor of the Moore
bound are pairwise stable for some link cost α, and have
price of anarchy Ω(log2 α).
Proof. (Sketch) We first establish that such a graph is
link convex. Consider a k-regular graph with shortest cycle
(girth) g. The removal of any link will increase the distance
of one vertex to g − 1, of k − 1 vertices to g − 2, and so
on for all vertices along a path up to g/2 away, leading to
total increase in distance cost of: Sr =
g/2∑
i=1
(k − 1)i+1(g − i).
On the other hand, the best-case addition for any link is
on the opposite side of a shortest cycle. The addition of
such a link will reduce the distance to nodes along two tree
paths of depth g/4. That is, the distance cost decrease from
adding any link is upper bounded by Sa =
g/4∑
i=1
(k−1)i+1(g−
i). Clearly Sr > Sa, which establishes link convexity, and
ensures pairwise stability for some Sa < α < Sr.
We now establish the price of anarchy of such a graph.
Consider a generalized Moore polygon, such that from any
vertex the number of nodes at distance 0, 1, 2, ..., D is 1, r, r(r−
1), r(r − 1)2, ... with the remaining vertices necessarily in
the furthest position, and where D is the diameter of the
graph. This assumption is not restrictive since only the
highest power matters to establish order, which does not
change with this particular construction. Then we have:
C(Gk,D) = n
(
αk + k
D−1∑
i
i(k − 1)i−1+
(n− 1− k
D−1∑
i
i(k − 1)D−1)D
)
≥ nαk + nk
D−1∑
i
i(k − 1)i−1,
where the order of the graph is a fixed constant times the
Moore bound of k(k−1)
D−2
2 . Moreover, the increase in dis-
tance cost from the removal of any link can be shown to
be lower bounded by
D∑
i=1
i(2D−i), expressed now in terms of
D. Together, we have that n = Θ(kD) and α = Θ(2D). For
suﬃciently large n, the price of anarchy becomes ρ(Gk,D) =
Ω(D) = Ω(log2 α).
This establishes a lower bound on the price of anarchy in
the BCG of ρBCG = Ω(log2 α).
The result also establishes that extremal graphs, which are
the largest k-regular graphs of diameter D, and cage graphs,
which are the smallest k-regular graphs of girth g, are pair-
wise stable for some α.4 Extremal graphs and cage graphs
feature prominently in network design since they have small
diameter and exhibit high fault tolerance for nodes with
specified degree [5] (see Figure 1). As such, it is a good fea-
ture that they appear as stable networks in the BCG. It is
also worth mentioning that these graphs are generally not
achievable in a Nash equilibrium of the UCG.
The condition of link convexity, although only suﬃcient
and not necessary in general, tends to be eﬀective in delin-
eating which graphs are pairwise stable. In particular, many
4By the same argument, we believe that these graphs have
price of anarchy Ω(log2 α). We can prove by the same con-
struction that extremal and cage graphs are link convex.
However, the Ω(log2 α) bound holds contingent on these
graphs being a constant factor from the Moore bound. Prov-
ing this for general k-regular graphs is an open problem in
graph theory, but is widely conjectured to be true.
asymmetric and non-regular graphs that contain cycles are
not link convex, and are not pairwise stable. Many sym-
metric graphs are also inadmissible. For example, while the
Desargues graph, a symmetric cubic distance-regular graph
on 20 vertices and 30 edges with diameter-to-girth ratio of
2/3 is link convex, the dodecahedral graph, a symmetric cubic
planar graph on 20 vertices and 30 edges with a diameter-
to-girth ratio of 1 is not.
Figure 1: Pairwise stable graphs. 1. The Petersen
graph is the unique (3,5) cage and Moore graph, and
is strongly regular with parameters (10,3,0,1). 2. The
McGee graph is a (3,7) cage. 3. The octahedral graph is
strongly regular with parameters (6,4,2,4). 4. The Cleb-
sch graph is strongly regular with parameters (16,5,0,2).
5. The Hoﬀman-Singleton graph is the unique (7,5) cage
and Moore graph, and is strongly regular with parame-
ters (50,7,0,1). 6. The star graph on 8 vertices.
4.2 An Upper Bound on the Price of Anarchy
We now provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy
in the BCG.
Proposition 4. For link cost α < n2, the worst-case
price of anarchy in the BCG is O(
√
α).
Proof. Note that d(i,j)(G) < 2
√
α for every i, j ∈ N
since otherwise i and j would bilaterally establish a direct
link to bring themselves closer to all nodes more than half
way to each other along the shortest path from i to j. So
we want to show that |A| = O(n2/√α). For any edge ai out
of vertex v we will count all vertices u for which (v, u) /∈ G.
Let Ti = {u ∈ N : the shortest path from v to u goes
through ai}. We ensure that Ti are disjoint by assuming
a canonical shortest path for every vertex. Note that be-
fore ai was built, in graph G
′, the alternative shortest path
from v to u ∈ Ti either didn’t exist or had length at most
2D(G) < 4
√
α, where D is the diameter of G. In the first
case, the graph has two components and we count |Ti|−1+
|V − Ti|− 1 = n− 2 = Ω(√α) non-edges (those incident on
v or w and the other component, where ai = (v, w)). In the
second case, d(v,u)(G
′) − d(v,u)(G) < 4√α. The total im-
provement is necessarily
∑
u
(d(v,u)(G
′)− d(v,u)(G)) ≥ α, i.e.
|Ti| = Ω(√α). In either case, non-edges are counted at most
twice. Therefore |A| = n2/√α and the price of anarchy is
O((n
√
α)/(
√
α+n)). For α < n, this upper bound is O(
√
α);
for α > n, this upper bound is O(n/
√
α). Combined, the
upper bound is O(min(
√
α, n/
√
α)), and O(
√
α).
In addition, as pointed out by Demaine et al. [8] after the
first version of this paper, the proof shows that the price
of anarchy is O(min(
√
α, n/
√
α)), which gives the improved
bound of O(n/
√
α) for α > n.
4.3 The Price of Anarchy in the BCG vs. the
UCG
In this section, we quantify and compare the price of anar-
chy in the BCG and UCG. Fabrikant et al. [10] conjectured
that all (non-transient) Nash equilibria in the UCG are trees,
for some link cost α > α for some constant α. They showed
that if this tree conjecture holds, the price of anarchy of the
UCG is constant.
Proposition 5. Let G(s) be a tree and a Nash equilib-
rium graph of the UCG for some link cost α. Then G(s) is
pairwise stable in the BCG for the same link cost.
Proof. If G(s) is a Nash equilibrium of the UCG then
link cost α ∈ Cα, where
Cα =
{
α′ : α′(
⏐⏐s′i⏐⏐− ⏐⏐si⏐⏐) ≥ ⏐⏐Ti(s)⏐⏐− ⏐⏐Ti(s− Λsi + Λs′i)⏐⏐
∀ i,∀ s′i ∈ Si
}
̸= ∅ (8)
We now restrict our attention to the set of deviations by i
such that
⏐⏐s′i⏐⏐ = ⏐⏐si⏐⏐+ 1. Let ∆|si|+1 = {r ∈ Si : ⏐⏐r⏐⏐ =⏐⏐si⏐⏐+1}. By (8), for a Nash equilibrium in UCG we need,
α ≥ ⏐⏐Ti(s)⏐⏐− ⏐⏐Ti(s− Λsi + Λs′i)⏐⏐,∀ i,∀ s′i ∈ ∆|si|+1.
Clearly,
{
r ∈ Si : r = si + Λ(i,j), j ̸∈ A(s)
}
⊂ ∆|si|+1.
Therefore,
α ≥ ⏐⏐Ti(s)⏐⏐− ⏐⏐Ti(s+ Λ(i,j))⏐⏐, ∀ i,∀ (i, j) ̸∈ A(s) (9)
This is also satisfies the lower bound expression αmin for
pairwise stability in the BCG (and in particular (3)). Fur-
thermore, if a graph is also stable to link severance because
without any edge the graph would be separated into two
components. The result follows.
Albers et al. [1] disproved the tree conjecture for the UCG,
but were able to give a constant upper-bound on the price
of anarchy in the UCG for α ∈ O(√n) and α ≥ 12n⌈log n⌉
(for which every Nash equilibrium in the UCG is indeed a
tree).
We conjecture that all Nash graphs of the UCG are pair-
wise stable in the BCG for the same link cost. This conjec-
ture is made on the basis of simulation results and analysis
of Nash graphs of the UCG.5 If true, then this would es-
tablish that the price of anarchy is no better in the BCG
than the UCG, whatever the link cost.6 Without proving or
5In addition, not all pairwise stable graphs are Nash. For
example, cycle Cn for n > 5 (with each edge incurring the
cost of the edge in the clockwise direction), is not Nash sup-
portable in the UCG, since node 0 would lower its cost if it
linked to node 2 instead. Yet the cycle is a stable configu-
ration of the BCG (Lemma 6).
6In particular, for α = f(n), ρUCG(n) ∈ O(ρBCG(n)). For
α > 2, the optimum graph in both the UCG and the BCG
is a star. Consider any graph G (of size n) with cost C in
Figure 2: The average PoA in equilibrium networks
with ten agents in the UCG and BCG, as a function
of link cost. (For link cost α, the x-axis plots log(α)
and log(2α) in the UCG and BCG, respectively.)
Figure 3: The average number of links in equilibrium
networks with ten agents in the UCG and BCG as a
function of link cost. (For link cost α, the x-axis plots
log(α) and log(2α) in the UCG and BCG, respectively.)
disproving this conjecture, Demaine et al. [8] prove that the
price of anarchy is higher in the BCG than the UCG. First,
they give improved upper-bounds in the UCG to prove a
constant upper bound for α = O(n1−ϵ) for any fixed ϵ > 0,
and obtain an o(nϵ) bound for general α; see also Albers et
al. [1]. Second, they prove that our upper bound in the BCG
is tight, establishing the price of anarchy of the BCG to be
Ω(min(
√
α,m/
√
α)). This gives a strict separation between
the price of anarchy in the UCG and the BCG.
4.4 Discussion
The best-response dynamic in the UCG is more powerful
than in the BCG. The problem of mutual blocking in the
formation of new links in the BCG and the limited capac-
ity to coordinate aﬀorded to players under pairwise stability
means that players are less able to react to the positive ex-
ternalities of other players’ links, which is the root cause of
the tension between stability and eﬃciency in the connection
game for α > 1. This has two major consequences.
On the one hand, the set of pairwise stable network ge-
ometries in the BCG is richer than the set of Nash equilib-
rium network shapes admitted in the UCG. For example, ex-
tremal and cage graphs, which feature prominently in many
communication network designs, are pairwise stable in the
BCG but not generally Nash supportable in the UCG.7
the UCG. The cost in the BCG is at least C + α(n − 1).
Adopting an expression for the social cost of the star in the
denominator, we have ρUCG(G) = C/((n−1)(2n+α−2)) and
ρBCG(G) ≥ (C+α(n−1))/((n−1)(2n+2α−2)). For any α =
f(n), ρUCG(G) ≤ 2ρBCG(G). For 1 < α ≤ 2 the complete
graph is the optimum in the UCG and the star remains the
optimum in the BCG. By a similar analysis, for any graph
G with cost C in the UCG we have ρUCG(G) = C/(n(n −
1)((α − 2)/2 + 2) and ρBCG(G) ≥ (C + α(n − 1))/((n −
1)(2n + 2α − 2)). For any 1 < α ≤ 2, ρUCG(G) ≤ C/((n −
1)(3n/2)) ≤ 2C/((n−1)(2n+2α−2)) ≤ 2ρBCG(G) for large
enough n, where the first inequality follows by substituting
α = 1.
7With the notable exception of the Petersen graph ((3, 5)-
cage), which constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the UCG for
On the other hand, the limited capacity of players in the
BCG to react to externalities in the game is what drives the
social cost of an equilibrium graph in the BCG to be worse
than in the UCG.
5. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE
AVERAGE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section we quantify the diﬀerence between the price
of anarchy of equilibrium networks in the BCG and the UCG
over the set of equilibrium networks, as opposed to only the
worst case network. In particular, we want to capture the
diﬀerence between the average price of anarchy of equilib-
rium networks in both games for a given link cost α. Solv-
ing for a Nash network in the UCG and a pairwise stable
network in the BCG are both NP -complete problems [10,
14, 22]. Given the intractability of providing a full char-
acterization of all equilibrium networks for a large number
of players, we restrict our attention to small networks. On
the other hand, we want to consider a large enough set-
ting so that the multiplicity of equilibria will bring out the
diﬀerence between the BCG and UCG. In what follows we
consider a setting with ten agents. We compute all pairwise
stable graphs in the BCG and all Nash graphs in the UCG
by enumeration of all connected topologies on ten vertices.8
Figure 2 shows the average price of anarchy of equilib-
rium networks in the BCG and UCG for diﬀerent link cost
values. The general increase in the average price of anarchy
for intermediate link costs is explained by the multiplicity of
suboptimal equilibria (all equilibrium networks are trees for
α > n2). In contrast, for intermediate link costs many inef-
ficient topologies are admitted to the stable set (in addition
to the eﬃcient graph).
The results corroborate the theoretical analysis, reflecting
1 ≤ α ≤ 4.
8The precise algorithm is omitted for lack of space. Our
graph enumeration technique hinges on many fast checks to
rule out inadmissible topologies before exhaustively checking
if they constitute equilibria.
a stark diﬀerence between the topologies of graphs admitted
by the BCG and UCG. In addition, we see that when links
are inexpensive, the average price of anarchy in the BCG
is lower than for the UCG. However, as links become more
expensive the situation changes: pairwise stable networks in
the BCG are then generally less eﬃcient than Nash networks
in the UCG.
Whereas agents in the BCG can get stuck in a badly sub-
optimal configuration, the ability of agents in the UCG to
arbitrarily change their outgoing links means players can
construct a smaller number of well-placed links. In con-
trast, as links become more expensive, stable networks in
the BCG tend to become overconnected and increasingly
ineﬃcient. Indeed, the plot in Figure 3 shows that stable
graphs in the BCG contain more edges than equilibrium
graphs in the UCG on average, for a range of link costs. As
links become more expensive, graphs with more edges are
increasingly over-connected and ineﬃcient.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented a bilateral, consent-driven model of network
formation. We prove a a lower bound of Ω(log2 α) and an
upper bound of O(
√
α) on the price of anarchy in the game
for pairwise stable networks (equivalently, networks achiev-
able in a pairwise Nash equilibrium.) We conjecture that
all Nash graphs of the UCG are pairwise stable in the BCG
for the same link cost. This conjecture would establish that
the price of anarchy is no better in the BCG than the UCG,
whatever the relationship between link cost α and size of
graph, n.9 Empirical analysis of equilibrium networks in
the BCG and the UCG also suggests that the worst-case is
strictly worse in the bilateral game. In addition, while the
average price of anarchy of equilibrium networks in the bi-
lateral setting is better than in the unilateral setting when
links are inexpensive, the situation is reversed when links be-
come more expensive. Altogether, the comparative results
suggest that worst-case equilibrium networks have a higher
price of anarchy in a consent-driven network formation set-
ting where players are limited in their ability to coordinate
simultaneously than when consent is not required and play-
ers are unconstrained in their ability to act selfishly.
Our investigations into the role of consent in network for-
mation suggest that the rules of engagement strongly aﬀect
the set of possible equilibria. We are currently investigating
how bilateral and multilateral transfers between players may
help mediate the price of anarchy in the connection game.
We are also interested in extending the game to a setting
where the network formation is dynamic and on-going. The
dynamics of network formation can be controlled by an in-
termediary, subject to equilibrium constraints suggested by
the dynamic network formation process.
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